






















I kam extremely grateful to all of the contributors to this sympo-
sium for taking the time to discuss my 
research with me and for formulating 
the extremely interesting, varied and 
challenging essays collected in this is-
sue. As my argument has been, over the 
course of the last six months, a work in 
progress, I am conscious of having pre-
sented to my critics something of a ‘mov-
ing target’. That is to say, I have sought 
to adjust my argument in order to make 
it less vulnerable to their telling objec-
tions. Whether I have succeeded in that 
enterprise is for the reader to decide. I 
would simply say that to the extent I do 
succeed, it is in no small measure thanks 
to the generous and constructive criti-
cism of the contributing authors.
I could not hope to do justice to the 
richness of the foregoing essays in this 
short reply, and so I will not attempt to 
address each article in detail. (Of course, 
this approach has the added benefit of 
enabling me to overlook those more 
troubling objections to which I can find 
no adequate response.) Instead, I seek to 
clarify and defend my argument against 
fundamental objections that seem to me 
to loom large in all of the papers. My re-
ply is organised under three headings. 
First, I shall address the relationship be-
tween aspirational and preventive ethics 
in my account; secondly, I shall attend to 
the question of the universality of sove-
reign evil; and, finally, I shall conclude 
with some reflections on the ambitions 
and limits of political theory.
Aspiration and Prevention 
In his contribution to this issue, Elvio 
Baccarini poses the following question: 
“why does Edyvane think that preventiv-
ist theories are preferable to aspiration-
alist theories?” The short answer to that 
question is that I do not think preven-
tivist theories preferable to aspiration-
alist theories. Rather, I think that theo-
ries which acknowledge the dualism of 
aspiration and prevention are preferable 
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to those that elide or conflate it. My in-
tention is not at all to argue for the pre-
ventive ethic and against the aspirational 
ethic. As I indicated in my introduction 
to this collection, my intention is rather 
to posit a fundamental dualism in which 
both aspiration and prevention have vi-
tal roles to play. The public morality of 
a given society at a given time will al-
ways be the product of an uneasy com-
promise between the rival claims of as-
piration and prevention. And, crucially, 
that is not to say that public morality is 
composed of a compromise between ri-
val political camps – the ‘aspirationalists’ 
and the ‘preventivists’. Each and every 
one of us, on the model I am propos-
ing, is subject to the claims of both as-
piration and prevention: the rival public 
ethics have as their shadow the private 
interplay of innocence and experience in 
the mind of the individual.
It is true that I focus primarily in my 
argument on the preventive ethic. That 
is partly because it has seemed to me the 
more neglected side of public morality 
in the contemporary literature, and also 
because it has seemed the more pressing 
in the times of uncertainty in which we 
live. But none of this is to say that the 
aspirational ethic is unimportant, much 
less to be abandoned in favour of a pre-
ventive alternative. My claim is rather 
that the two sides of the dualism stand to 
one another in what Michael Oakeshott 
terms a ‘concordia discors’ – a discordant 
harmony (Oakeshott, 1996). The claims 
of aspiration on one hand and of preven-
tion on the other are normally at odds 
with each other, but they are also inter-
dependent. 
There is a fairly clear sense, I think, 
in which the aspirational ethic depends 
upon the preventive ethic. It is not easy 
to pursue one’s aspirations whilst the 
threat of sovereign evil is imminent. 
However, there is also a sense in which 
the preventive ethic depends on the as-
pirational ethic. It is ultimately only be-
cause the expression of human life and 
liveliness in the formation of ethical as-
pirations is so important to us that the 
preventive ethic seems to matter. We 
prevent evil partly in order to create 
room for aspiration. In this sense, an 
acknowledgement of the importance of 
aspiration is built into the preventive 
ethic. And just to be clear, note that this is 
not the same as Michael Walzer’s claim, 
which I challenged in the introduction, 
that the prevention of some specific evil 
matters only because of some specific, 
antecedently acknowledged and match-
ing aspiration. The claim rather is that 
the preventive ethic matters only be-
cause aspiration as such is something we 
recognise as fundamental to the possi-
bility of a decent human existence. 
Thus, the idea that we are confront-
ed by any kind of straightforward choice 
between aspiration and prevention is in 
my view unintelligible. Consider what 
Oakeshott has to say about the concor-
dia discors of what he terms the ‘politics 
of faith’ and the ‘politics of scepticism’, 
which I think corresponds quite close-
ly to my distinction between aspiration 
and prevention:
If our choice lies (as it does) between 
one of the two current styles which 
compose our complex manner of 
political activity, then it is Hobson’s 
choice: in selecting either we are ex-
pecting of it something which it can-
not supply. ... Each [pole of political 
activity], in the abstract, may have 
the virtue of simplicity; but neither, 
as we know them, is capable of being 
by itself a concrete style of political 























In this sense we should be wary of 
those Oakeshott terms the ‘simplifiers’ 
who would have us pursue an agenda of 
‘preventionism’ or of ‘aspirationalism’. 
For reasons I have given, any such enter-
prise is liable to end in confusion at least, 
and perhaps even disaster.
So, my objection to the Rawlsian 
overlapping consensus is not that it is 
exclusively aspirational or utopian in its 
formulation. I think Baccarini is quite 
right to suggest that it contains ‘pre-
ventive and austere elements, as well’. 
My concern, rather, and as indicated, 
is with the manner in which it conflates 
the categories of aspiration and preven-
tion, turning the dualism into a monism 
and supposing that the two are neatly 
continuous. My worry is that it thereby 
leaves us with no account of the ground-
ing of the ethical considerations that 
might be brought to bear on conflicts 
between those within and those with-
out the overlapping consensus. Indeed, 
if Rawls is right, then it is very hard to 
see what grounding those considera-
tions could possibly have.
This clarification of my position 
enables me to respond also to a relat-
ed concern raised by Enes Kulenović. 
Kulenović imputes to me the assump-
tion that once the distinction is made 
between contingent evil, which is asso-
ciated with the aspirational ethic, and 
sovereign evil, which is associated with 
the preventive ethic, then ‘citizens will 
always give priority to the latter’. I do 
not assume that, and the points I have 
made here may help us to see why. As I 
have indicated, it is a consequence of my 
dualistic conception of public morality 
that citizens are subject to the claims 
of both the aspirational and the pre-
ventive ethics. I see no reason in prin-
ciple why citizens should prioritise one 
side or the other. I do think it possible 
to render intelligible the settled dispo-
sition to act on the claims of the pre-
ventive ethic, even when those claims 
involve the betrayal of one’s ethical as-
pirations (see Edyvane, 2012, ch. 7). 
But I have no account of why that is ne-
cessarily the right thing to do; I do not 
think it possible to demonstrate the pri-
ority of sovereign evil over contingent 
evil. In fact, I think it entirely reasona-
ble that citizens might sometimes see fit 
to violate the demands of the preventive 
ethic in the course of seeking to prevent 
some contingent evil that weighs parti-
cularly heavily with them.
The very idea of evil’s ‘sovereignty’ 
seems to imply, and is intended to im-
ply, a sense of overriding importance. 
Citizens will quite properly feel that they 
ought to give priority to the demands of 
the preventive ethic. However, my cen-
tral claim is that in the domain of public 
morality there are two sovereign masters 
– good and evil. Citizens will also, and 
again quite properly, feel that they ought 
to give priority to the demands of the as-
pirational ethic oriented to the sovereign 
good. This injects an inevitable and un-
avoidable instability into the very core of 
public life.
The Universality of Evil
The second objection I wish to ad-
dress is that, when it comes to the ne-
gotiation of deep moral conflict, the 
preventive ethic fares no better than its 
aspirational counterpart because con-
flicts of evil are just as deeply entrenched 
as conflicts of good. As Krešimir Petković 
puts it, “it is indeed hard to achieve con-
sensus on political good, but building 
politics on a consensus on great evils 
























Baccarini urges that sovereign evils are 
“more related to people’s worldviews” 
and hence “more contextual” than I have 
allowed. Kulenović, by contrast, and as 
I understand him, is willing to accept 
(for the sake of argument) the category 
of sovereign evil, but questions the like-
lihood of agreement within that catego-
ry on the nature, origins, ordering and 
strategies for preventing the various so-
vereign evils.
These objections rest, or so I believe, 
on a misinterpretation of my general en-
terprise. The key aim of my argument is 
to show why practices of civic virtue re-
main intelligible in conditions of con-
flicting ethical aspirations. My thesis is 
that such practices can be rendered in-
telligible by appeal to the way in which 
they prevent sovereign evils, evils upon 
which there may be consensus even 
while there is radical disagreement of 
ethical aspirations. In other words, we 
are to begin with a picture of a tolera-
bly stable practice of civic virtue among, 
say, liberals and illiberals. The key ques-
tion from my point of view is this: what 
could possibly ground such practices? 
The problem with prevailing theories of 
justice is that typically they have at this 
point nothing to say. As far as such the-
ories are concerned, there is in fact no 
ground for such practices. Evidently that 
conclusion can easily lead to cynicism 
and despair, to the sense that anything 
then is permitted in such contexts and 
nothing is forbidden. My claim is that 
we can in fact make sense of these sorts 
of practices of civic virtue, and that we 
can do so by appeal to the category of 
sovereign evil.
Now of course there is a further ques-
tion here of how likely it is that tolerably 
stable practices of civic virtue will come 
about in conditions of moral conflict. 
But that is not the question I am trying 
to answer. For what it is worth, I share 
some of the pessimism of my critics 
here: I do not think it terribly likely that 
practices of civic virtues will emerge and 
survive in circumstances of deep moral 
conflict and hostility, although some-
times they do. In any case, it was never 
my intention to persuade the reader that 
everything will turn out for the best af-
ter all.
There is one sense in which I think 
the objection might gain some trac-
tion (and a second, less direct sense, to 
which I’ll turn in the next section). If 
Kulenović’s thesis about the plurality of 
evil is intended as a metaphysical thesis, 
and not just a statement of the fact that it 
is hard to secure consensus on evil, then 
it does suggest a problem for my account. 
My account depends on the idea that it 
is at least in principle possible for there 
to be stable moral consensus on sove-
reign evil; the metaphysical plurality the-
sis (as I am interpreting it) denies that 
possibility. But then if that is what lies at 
the heart of our dispute, it seems to me 
that we are simply trading metaphysical 
speculations – mine involving a monis-
tic (or at least a universalist) conception 
of sovereign basic evil and Kulenović’s 
involving a pluralistic (non-universalist) 
conception. I am not sure that that is go-
ing to be a particularly fruitful dispute 
for us to pursue.
In order to see why, it might be help-
ful to consider an example. Kulenović re-
fers to my suggestion that war is among 
the sovereign evils of human life from 
which it is the task of preventive politics 
to protect us. But Kulenović suggests 
that war is not self-evidently a sovereign 
evil that would be recognised as such by 
any ‘normally responsive person’. As he 























as well as followers of Nietzsche or He-
gel’ to see things very differently:1
The reason that today war is per-
ceived as one of those evils that 
should be prevented is a conse-
quence of the narratives that were in-
troduced after the horrors of WWII. 
There was nothing inevitable about 
this process: it was a result of con-
scious effort to replace the narrative 
of the warrior ethic with that of war 
as one of the ultimate evils.
There are two points to be made 
here. The first is a matter of detail, al-
beit a rather important one: I would not 
want to suggest that war in and of itself is 
a sovereign evil. My claim rather is that 
the mutilations of war constitute a so-
vereign evil. Even so, it is still possible 
I think for Kulenović to press his objec-
tion here. Even if we are talking about 
the mutilations of war and not war it-
self, there is still a long tradition, bound 
up with the ‘warrior ethic’, that inter-
prets killing and dying in war as the su-
preme honour. Kulenović suggests that 
views have changed considerably since 
the 1940s, but only because we have suc-
cessfully replaced the old narrative of 
the warrior ethic with a new narrative 
according to which the mutilations of 
war are a very great evil.
This is an entirely coherent and plau-
sible speculation, but it is a speculation 
nevertheless and I would want to tell a 
different story about the same historical 
trajectory. In so far as the Homeric he-
roes did not recognise the sovereign evil 
of the mutilations of war, I would in-
1 If I were being uncharitable, I would note at 
this point that the Homeric heroes, Nietzsche 
and Hegel are not often invoked as exemplars 
of ‘normally responsive’ personhood, but I 
shall suspend that doubt in what follows.
deed want to suggest that they were not 
responding normally (where ‘normally’ 
is to be interpreted as meaning some-
thing close to ‘naturally’). I would sug-
gest that they had in fact been distracted 
from natural feeling by a set of beliefs, 
religious and political, that functioned 
to explain away their immediate aesthe-
tic revulsion at the prospect of killing and 
dying. And I would contend that what 
we have seen in the twentieth century 
is not the substitution of one narrative 
(death in war is the supreme honour) for 
another narrative (death in war is the su-
preme evil), but rather a shocking recall 
to natural feelings otherwise suppressed 
by what Wilfred Owen called the ‘old 
lie’: dulce et decorum est pro patria mori 
(Owen, 1994: 29). I believe that my story 
also constitutes a coherent and plausible 
speculation. There is no decisive argu-
ment to be offered on either side here. 
My argument for the universality of so-
vereign evil is not intended to be de-
cisive, but is rather meant to provide a 
metaethical speculation that is coherent 
and that offers a broadly persuasive ac-
count of the darker reaches of human 
ethical experience.
Conclusion: The Ambitions 
and Limits of Political Theory 
I suspect that what are really at 
stake in most of the disagreements that 
emerge here are two rather different per-
spectives on the ambitions and limits of 
political theory. My critics interpret my 
enterprise as a work of normative theory 
that aspires to be action-guiding. They 
suppose that I am proposing preventive 
politics as a worthy solution to our cur-
rent predicament, and accordingly they 
object that it is unrealistic to think that it 
could so rescue us. Thus, and as Petković 
























political theory of preventive morality, 
then we need to “develop a clear theore-
tical picture of evil’s functioning in order 
to form a theoretical basis for policies to 
tackle it, within the framework of ade-
quate political morality”.
But, as I have indicated, I do not see 
my enterprise in those terms. I see it as 
something closer to a form of ‘explana-
tory theory’ the aim of which is to make 
sense of public morality and to demon-
strate the intelligibility of practices of 
civic virtue in conditions of conflict. I 
have no intention of telling anyone what 
they ought politically to be pursuing, or 
how they should go about ‘tackling’ evil, 
or whether such endeavours have any 
chance whatsoever of ending in success. 
All of those questions fall almost entire-
ly outside of the scope of my inquiry. In 
fact, I am inclined to say that they fall 
largely beyond the limits of political the-
ory as such. They are not, to my mind, 
properly philosophical questions. Or at 
least they are questions to which philo-
sophy will never be able to provide satis-
factory answers.
Consequently, I suspect that I have 
a rather more limited view of the prop-
er ambitions of political theory than my 
critics do, and that perhaps they credit 
me with a more ambitious project than 
I have actually undertaken. But in so far 
as that is the case, it leads into the second 
way I mentioned above in which the ob-
jection to my account of the universali-
ty of sovereign evil might gain traction. 
It might be said that my account is far 
too unambitious, and that it fails to ad-
dress the actual problems of politics that 
we face. And so, as Baccarini suggests, it 
scarcely matters whether or not a sound 
metaphysical case for the universality of 
evil can be made, for when it comes to 
conflict negotiation and the avoidance 
of anarchy in the real world, “we must 
focus on what people [actually] feel or 
think as being of primary importance”. 
In this way, Petković turns my own criti-
cism of the aspirational theorists against 
me – perhaps I, too, am guilty of “fid-
dling while Rome burns”.
I shall end here on a more concessive 
note, for I am not without sympathy for 
this objection. I would like, though, to 
make two final points in response. The 
first is to emphasise that my account 
does carry some implications for poli-
tical action. As I have stressed through-
out, I would wish to maintain that my 
argument serves to resist the ‘counsel of 
despair’ which contends that there is no 
stable basis for public morality in condi-
tions of moral conflict and so there is no 
point in even trying to uphold any sort 
of ethical standard in such circumstan-
ces. I would like to think that I have 
made some contribution to the case for 
civic virtue, even in the most desperate 
of circumstances. I would also like to 
think that my account of the dualistic 
structure of public morality could poten-
tially help us better to understand prac-
tices of civic virtue and thus provide a 
resource for those seeking to foster such 
practices, especially by revealing some 
of the less apparent possibilities and lim-
its of their endeavours. Nevertheless, I 
accept that my account does not deliver 
(or even imply) the sort of comprehen-
sive programme of political action that 
my critics and others might want to see. 
In so far as that sort of comprehensive 
programme is what we should like to 
see, however – and this is my second re-
sponse – I suspect that we political phi-
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